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NOTE
STANDARDS OF DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEYS IN
COLORADO AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
T HIS note will discuss the standards of discipline applicable
to attorneys in Colorado, setting forth the general stand-
ards governing attorneys' conduct and articulating the manner
in which these standards are given meaning. In particular,
it will focus upon the newly adopted Code of Professional
Responsibility, discussing its significance in Colorado.
Rule 241 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which
sets forth the current standards governing the discipline of
attorneys, provides:
Any act committed by an attorney contrary to the high-
est standards of honesty, justice or morality, whether com-
mitted in his capacity as an attorney or otherwise, even
though not amounting to a felony or misdemeanor, may con-
stitute cause for discipline, and where such act constitutes a
felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal pro-
ceeding shall not be a condition precedent to suspension or
to the institution of disciplinary proceedings, nor shall acquit-
tal necessarily constitute a bar thereto. That an act com-
plained of is malum prohibitum rather than malum in se shall
not, of itself, constitute a defense to a charge of misconduct.
Any violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
. . . and acts of gross carelessness or gross negligence com-
mitted by an attorney in his capacity as an attorney may also
constitute cause for discipline. 1
The three general grounds of discipline for Colorado attorneys
set forth in this rule may be summarized as follows: (1) acts
committed contrary to the highest standards of honesty, jus-
tice, or morality; (2) acts of gross carelessness or gross neg-
ligence; and (3) acts in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Before proceeding with a discussion of these general
standards, the procedures followed in disciplinary actions
against attorneys and the disciplinary measures which may
be invoked for violation of these standards will be examined.
I COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. Procedures in Disciplinary Cases
According to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, the
supreme court has "original and exclusive jurisdiction" in all
matters involving disciplinary proceedings against attorneys.-
Although the power of the supreme court to discipline has
long been recognized as an inherent power, :' the court's ex-
clusive jurisdiction of such proceedings was not given explicit
recognition within the rules until May 1959.
4
The rules provide for a permanent grievance committee
which is to be an adjunct of the supreme court, and whose
nine members are to be appointed by the court." The grievance
committee has the primary responsibility for handling disci-
plinary matters, and makes recommendations on such matters
to the supreme court.
Informal complaints relating to the conduct of an attorney
are handled by this committee. The committee may dismiss
an informal complaint as providing a wholly inadequate basis
for disciplinary action if it finds that the complaint is of a
trivial or frivolous nature." Should the committee conclude
that a complaint warrants further investigation, it may in-
vestigate the matter itself, or the committee "may refer the
same to an attorney or a bar association for investigation." 7
(This limited investigative function is currently the only role
the Colorado Bar Association or local bar associations play in
disciplinary matters.) s On completion of an investigation, the
2 Id.
3 Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312
P.2d 998 (1957); Pecple v. Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 57 P. 1079 (1899).
4 Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp. 1960).
; COLO. R. Civ. P. 242.
"Id. at 246.
7Id.
8 Id. Under this rule a bar association may also conduct hearings, make
findings and a report as well as conduct investigations. In practice,
however, the only function bar associations now play in disciplinary
matters, and have played since June 25, 1970, is that of limited investi-
gation. Interviews with L. James Arthur, Assistant Attcrney General
of Colorado, in Denver, Colo., June 30, 1972; Harold Auger, Assistant
Clerk of the Supreme Court and Secretary of the Grievance Com-
mittee, in Denver, Colo., June 26, 1972; Norman Berman, former Mem-
ber of the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, in D2nver, Colo., Aug.
29, 1972; Joseph Cook, former Member of the Supreme Court Grievance
Committee, in Denver, Colo., June 27, 1972; William McClearn, Mem-
ber of the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, in Denver, Colo.,
June 29, 1972; William Miller, Executive Secretary of the Colorado Bar
Association, in Denver, Colo., June 29, 1972; Aan Sternberg, Member
cf the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, in Denver, Colo., June 28,
1972; [hereinafter cited as Intrviewsl. Opinicns of those interviewed
are expressed as those of the entire group because individuals did not
wish to have their opinions separately identified.
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informal complaint may be dismissed, or further proceedings
may be conducted by way of a formal complaint.!' If minor
ethical violations are disclosed by the investigation, and the
committee concludes that, although formal disciplinary action
by the supreme court is not warranted, the complaint should
not be dismissed as being without merit, it may direct that a
letter of admonition be sent to the attorney against whom the
complaint was filed.'
If a formal complaint is filed, either upon authorization
of the supreme court or through a private individual, the
grievance committee gives notice and serves process upon the
attorney named in the complaint." The attorney thus served
is given an opportunity to answer the complaint, 12 and a
formal hearing is held before a "hearings committee" or a
"hearings officer" appointed in accordance with rule 251. At
the conclusion of the formal hearing, a report setting forth
the findings and recommendations of the hearings committee
is submitted to the entire grievance committee. 3
The full grievance committee may, if it finds that the
charges are unfounded and unproven, act upon the findings
and recommendations by entering an order dismissing the
complaint. 4 Alternatively, the committee may, upon a finding
that the charges have been "established by substantial, clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence,"' 5 recommend discipline
in the form of private censure, public censure, suspension (for
a definite or an indefinite period), or disbarment."' If disci-
pline is recommended by the committee, the matter is then
docketed in the supreme court,T and a citation is issued.18 The
respondent is given an opportunity to file exceptions to the
committee report,"' and briefs may be filed by the parties in
accordance with rule 256(e). The case is determined by the
supreme court on the committee record.2-' The court may dis-
miss the matter, impose discipline in accordance with the
11 CoLo. R. Civ. P. 246.
1 "Id.
I IId. at 247, 248.
12 Id. at 249.
1 : Id. at 254. If the entire grievance committee sits as the hearings commit-
tee, it will make findings and recommendations.
14 Id. at 254(a).
'5,Id. at 254.
'"Id. at 254(b).





recommendations of the grievance committee, or impose "such




B. Statistics and Analysis
The statistical information in Table 1 indicates the number
of complaints and disciplinary proceedings initiated against
members of the bar in Colorado in the past 13 years .2 It is
difficult to make many generalizations concerning the signi-
ficance of this data as it is limited in scope and accurate
records of disciplinary matters are a recent development. How-
ever, certain questions may be raised and certain conclusions
may be attempted based upon this limited information. Before
examining the data, however, it may be helpful to review
the procedural developments in attorney discipline in order
that the data may be discussed in its proper historical per-
spective.
TABLE 1 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS IN COLORADO: 1959-72
1959 to
Type of Proceeding 196923 1969 1970 1971 1972
Informal complaints filed with
Grievance Committee of Colorado
Supreme Court 2 4  937 161 219 280 345
Informal complaints dismissed
at informal level 787 97 129 148 242
Formal complaints filed 112 39 16 34 21
Formal hearings held2.5  102 16 16 21 26
211d. at 256(c), (d).
22 As could best be determined, this data has never before been released
by the Colorado Supreme Court. This information was made available
by the supreme court in accordance with COLO. R. Crv. P. 259. The
statistical data presented is only part of that requested; however, it
represents the sum total of all data currently compiled and available
concerning disciplinary cases. Since the supreme court, in accord with
rule 259, refused access to case files, other information could not be
obtained.
23 These statistics are only estimates as the Colorado Bar Association and
local bar associations, which played a major role in the discipline of
attorneys during this period, kept no accurate record. (See text p. 211
infra.) Interviews.
24 These statistics concerning informal complaints are misleading. For a
discussion of this matter, see text p. 213 infra. It should also be noted
from Table I that the number of informal complaints dismissed at the
informal level and the number of formal complaints filed do not equal
the number of informal complaints filed with the grievance committee
initially in any one year. This discrepancy can be explained by the
fact that often several informal complaints filed with the committee
against the same attorney are combined within one formal complaint
against the attorney. Also, informal complaints filed with the com-
mittee during one year may not be considered until the subsequent
year.
25The number of dismissals after a formal hearing and the number of
instances of formal discipline by the supreme court being imposed
after a formal hearing (private censures, public censures, suspensions,
and disbarments), do not equal the number of formal hearings held in
any one year. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that a
formal hearing on a case may be held in one year, but dismissal or




Dispositions after a formal hearing 1969 1969 1970 1971 1972
Dismissals unknown 2 0 4 5
Private censures 39 5 5 5 8
Public censures 14 1 0 1 4
Suspensions (definite and indefinite) 14 1 4 5 3
Disbarments 20 0 1 3 2
Formal discipline total 87 7 10 14 17
Dispositions without a formal hearing
not in not in
Letters of admonition effect effect 7 18 52
Total discipline 87 7 17 32 69
The supreme court seemed to take a casual attitude toward
the discipline of attorneys until the late 1950's. Prior to May
1959, the Colorado Bar Association played its most extensive
role in the discipline of attorneys, with the Bar Association
Grievance Committee acting in a manner similar to that of
the current grievance committee. 26 But neither a record of the
complaint, the investigation, if any, nor the ultimate disposi-
tion was required to be kept. The bar association committee
was responsible for an initial determination of the merit of a
complaint, the supreme court exercising its disciplinary power
only after committee consideration and recommendation. 27 No
authority existed independently of the bar association to handle
first impression disciplinary matters; thus, the bar association
was primarily responsible for the disciplining of its own mem-
bers.
After May of 1959, the Colorado Bar Association and local
bar associations continued their dominant role in the disci-
pline of attorneys. Until June 1970, they handled minor dis-
ciplinary matters through investigations and hearings conducted
by their grievance committees, and through in-house discipline
for minor infractions. 2 Such practices prevailed during these
years despite the supreme court's assumption, in 1959, of
"exclusive jurisdicition 29 over disciplinary affairs and the
vesting of initial jurisdiction over such matters in the griev-
ance committee of the supreme court3 0
Although these facts might indicate a lack of serious
intent by the supreme court to assume a forceful role in the
disciplinary field, they might be equally indicative of the re-
luctance of the Colorado Bar Association and local bar asso-
ciations to part with their disciplinary functions.
26 E.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (1953). Interviews.
27 E.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (1953).
28 Interviews.
29I CoLo. R. Civ. P. 241, formerly Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp. 1960).
3,, COLO. R. Civ. P. 246, formerly Colo. R. Civ. P. 246 (Supp. 1960).
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On June 25, 1970, in order to provide a uniform policy
governing all disciplinary cases, the Colorado Supreme Court
exercised its exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of at-
torneys.3 1 The Colorado Bar Association and local bar asso-
ciations were expressly forbidden from continuing to disci-
pline attorneys within the field pre-empted by the supreme
court.32 Additionally, the secretary of the grievance committee
was ordered to keep a permanent record of all disciplinary
matters.33 (These records are reproduced in Table 1 supra.)
The supreme court's assumption of the exclusive role in
the discipline of attorneys and the marked change in the
handling of record keeping demonstrates the changing attitude
of the supreme court in recent years.34 The data presented in
Table 1 tends to support the view that the present court is
more concerned with the supervision of the legal profession.
There appears to be a trend toward more formal disciplinary
action by the supreme court (seven instances of formal dis-
cipline being invoked by the court in 1969, 10 in 1970, 14 in
1971, and 17 in 1972) and more letters of admonition being
issued by the grievance committee (seven letters in 1970, 18
in 1971, and 52 in 1972). Approximately .4 percent of all at-
torneys in Colorado were disciplined in 1970, while 1.5 percent
of Colorado attorneys were disciplined in 1972.
35
Even though it may appear from the small minority of at-
torneys disciplined in Colorado that the supreme court is not
adequately supervising the legal profession, comparison of Colo-
rado's figures with those of the nation as a whole indicates
that Colorado attorneys are supervised much more strictly than
the attorneys in most states.
36
31 Colo. Sup. Ct. Order, Statement of Policy Concerning the Jurisdiction
of the Grievance Comm. of the Sup. Ct. (Exhibit A) (June 25, 1970)




'34 These changes coincided with publication of the so-called Clark Report
and were undoubtedly influenced by recommendations made in that
report. The Clark Report strongly recommended increased state su-
preme court supervision over the legal profession in disciplinary mat-
ters. It was further recommended that accurate records of disciplinary
matters be kept in each state. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINE ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS & RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINE
ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft 1970).
35 There were approximately 3,900 attorneys in Colorado in 1970, and 17
instances of formal and informal discipline were recorded; thus .4%
of Colorado attorneys were disciplined in that year. There were approxi-
mately 4,600 Colorado attorneys in 1972 and 69 instances of formal
and informal discipline were recorded; thus 1.5% of Colorado attorneys
were disciplined in that year. Interviews.
Of the approximately 360,000 attorneys in this country in 1972 only 309
were publicly disciplined; i.e., disbarred, suspended, or publicly cen-
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In 1972, 345 of the 4,600 attorneys presently in the state had
informal complaints filed against them with the grievance com-
mittee. Although it would appear from this that only a small
fraction of clients are dissatisfied with services rendered by
their attorneys, many disgruntled clients may feel that little
will be accomplished if they do file a complaint. Also, a lack
of public awareness of disciplinary procedures may discourage
dissatisfied clients from filing complaints. Some will naturally
argue that the 345 informal complaints filed against attorneys
in one year represents a large number of complaints, for, on
the surface, this figure means that approximately 7.5 percent
of the attorneys in Colorado had informal complaints filed
against them in that year. This figure of 7.5 percent is some-
what misleading, however, for multiple informal complaints
are occasionally filed against the same attorneys.3
7
The arguably small number of informal complaints filed
with the grievance committee might also be due to the fact
that complaints made to the Colorado Bar Association or to
the local bar associations may never reach the committee.
This would happen if a complainant is informed by a bar
association that his complaint is without merit and the com-
plainant chooses not to bring his claim to the attention of the
grievance committee.38 A bar association might also handle the
complainant's problem informally; e.g., telephone the attorney
and try to work out a settlement of whatever problem exists.
If a complaint filed with a bar association is handled in either
of these ways, it does not become part of the supreme court's
data on informal complaints.39 If, on the other hand, a com-
plaint is originally filed with the secretary of the grievance
committee, it does become part of the court's statistical data
regardless of merit or informal solution.40 The figure of 345
sured. This indicates a national ratio of less than one out of 1,000. As
Table 1 indicates, in 1972 nine out of the 4,600 attorneys in Colorado
were publicly disiplined. This indicates a ratio of approximately two
out of 1,000, or about twice the national average. Telephone conversation
with Russel Twist, Acting Director, Department of Prcfessional Stand-
ards, American Bar Association, Chicago, Ill., June 14, 1973.
37 Grievance committee records indicate that one out of every five in-
formal complaints filed is against an attorney who has been named in
a previous complaint. For a more detailed analysis of disciplinary
actions taken in Colorado during 1971-1972 see Plaut, A Survey of
Grievance Complaints Filed Against Colorado Attorneys: 1971-1972,
COLO. LAW., Aug. 1973, at 7.
'8 Also, fee disputes are primarily handled through the Legal Fee Review
Committees of either the Colorado or Denver Bar Associations.
Interviews.
3.3 Colo. Sup. Ct. Order Concerning Jurisdiction of Grievance Comm.
40 Id.
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informal complaints filed in 1972 is, therefore, misleading.
Under current disciplinary procedures, meritorious com-
plaints are required to be referred to the grievance committee
regardless of the person with whom the complaint is first filed,
since the committee and the court have exclusive jurisdiction in
the disciplinary field.4' However, the number of meritorious
complaints considered by the committee seems small com-
pared to the number of frivolous complaints filed. Most informal
complaints handled by the committee are dismissed (129 out
of 219 in 1970, or 59 percent, and 148 out of 280 in 1971, or 53
percent). The number and percentage of dismissals increased
substantially in 1972 (242 out of 345, or 70 percent).
The large number of informal complaints dismissed by
the grievance commitee seems to indicate that the majority of
complaints filed with the committee are nonmeritorious. How-
ever, this high dismissal rate could be due to the inadequate
personnel available to properly investigate the merits of each
complaint. Most investigations at the informal level are con-
ducted by one of the nine members of the grievance com-
mittee, with few investigations being conducted by other mem-
bers of the bar.42 An additional problem is encountered in the
fact that no remuneration is given for the time spent investi-
gating.43 Although the rules provide for a delegation of inves-
tigatory power,44 funding of these investigations would remain
a problem.
Once a formal complaint is filed and a hearing is held,
there are very few dismissals (0 in 1970, 4 in 1971, and 5 in 1972).
This demonstrates the need for adequate investigatory ma-
chinery at the informal level, for it appears to be at this level
that very critical decisionmaking takes place. Once sufficient
grounds are found not to dismiss an informal complaint, either
a letter of admonition or formal discipline by the supreme
court seems virtually certain to follow.
When an attorney is disciplined, there appears to be a
greater possibility that it will be by the grievance committee
through a letter of admonition, than by the supreme court
through formal discipline. Since letters of admonition first
began to be issued in 1970 by the grievance committee, their
usage has increased substantially (see Table 1). If this trend
41Id.; COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
42 Interviews.
43 See COLO. R. Cirv. P. 242. (Members are, however, reimbursed for rea-
sonable expenses incurred in the performance of official activities).
44 COLO. R. Civ. P. 246.
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continues, it will be the grievance committee and not the
supreme court that is the primary disciplinary agency. The
desirability of this procedure is questionable due, inter alia,
to the lack of due process safeguards that ostensibly exist in
formal disciplinary proceedings.
An attorney does have the right "to request in writing
that formal disciplinary proceedings be initiated against him
to adjudicate the propriety of the conduct upon which the
admonition is based. '45 If such a request is made, the letter
of admonition is vacated and the matter processed as a formal
complaint with eventual consideration of the case by the su-
preme court.41 To date, however, only one attorney has appealed
the issuance of a letter of admonition (out of 77 letters is-
sued) .47 Perhaps so few attorneys have appealed letters of
admonition because of the nature of this informal mode of
discipline, the time required to perfect an appeal, and required
to attend a hearing.
48
Currently under consideration by the supreme court are
changes in the disciplinary rules and procedures. 4 1 The extent
of these changes is as yet unknown. That the court is even
considering what will undoubtedly be fairly extensive changes
in disciplinary procedures, indicates a concern on the part of
the supreme court with the adequacy of the present process.
II. How MEANING Is GIVEN To THE STANDARD OF
HONESTY, JUSTICE, AND MORALITY
In discussing the standards or grounds of discipline ap-
plicable to Colorado attorneys, the major question raised is
how content or meaning is given to the important, yet vague,
requirement that all members of the bar adhere to the "highest
standards of honesty, justice, and morality.
50
4. Colo. Sup. Ct. Order, Rule Authorizing Letters of Admonition (Exhibit
B) (June 25, 1970).
46 Id.
47 Interview with Harold Auger, Assistant Clerk of the Supreme Court
and Secretary of the Grievance Committee, in Denver, Colo., June 26,
1972.
48 In addition, it has never been definitely determined whether or not
the grievance committee could re-issue a letter of admonition after the
consideration of an appeal, or if the only alternatives are to recommend
formal discipline or to dismiss the complaint. Interviews. With the
existence of such uncertainty, it is understandable that an attorney
might be reluctant to appeal the issuance of a letter of admonition by
the grievance committee.
411 Interview with Mr. Edward Day, Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court,
in Denver, Colo., June 28, 1972.
:,l COLO. R. Civ. P. 241. This standard was incorporated into the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure on May 14, 1959. Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp.
1960). However, it was not a new disciplinary standard even then, for
it was implicitly referred to in several early Colorado cases: "To be
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A. Case Law
In examining this standard, one may look to the case law
of Colorado to see how certain types of conduct have been,
and are considered to be, contrary to the highest standards
of honesty, justice, or morality. The case law provides evi-
dence of the kind of conduct warranting discipline, and thereby
actionable in disciplinary proceedings the conduct complained of must
amount to a violation of law or it must involve 'moral turpitude or
dishonorable conduct.'" Petition of the Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357,
361, 325 P.2d 932, 934 (1958); "[T]he moral character of the act is the
all-important consideration in a disbarment proceeding." People v.
Hillyer, 88 Colo. 428, 435, 297 P. 1004, 1006 (1931); "[I]t is the duty of
a lawyer practicing at the bar of the state, to transact whatever busi-
ness he may attend to in a reputable and honorable manner, and he is
held to the rule of honorable conduct as a citizen, whether that conduct
relates to the practice of the profession or not." People v. Patterson, 56
Colo. 296, 299, 138 P. 30, 31 (1914); "In no other calling should so strict
an adherence to ethical and moral obligations be exacted, or so high
a degree of accountability be enforced." People v. Keegan, 18 Colo. 237,
239, 32 P. 424, 425 (1893). See also People v. Laska, 105 Colo. 426, 101
P.2d 33 (1940); People v. Kaufman, 90 Colo. 8, 5 P.2d 1114 (1931);
People v. Taylor, 32 Colo. 250, 75 P. 914 (1904); People v. Mead, 29
Colo. 344, 68 P. 241 (1902); People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258, 64 P. 191
(1901); People v. Waldron, 28 Colo. 249, 64 P. 186 (1901); People v.
Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 57 P. 1079 (1899); People v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186,
32 P. 280 (1893); People v. Brown, 17 Colo. 431, 30 P. 338 (1892); People
v. Green, 9 Colo. 506, 13 P. 514 (1887).
An example of one explicit reference to this standard was made in
In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
a leading case handed down just a few years before this standard was
incorporated into the rules. In that case, the court recognized the dis-
tinction between "that which is inherently wrong and inherently right,
or that which is basically immoral and basically moral, or that which
is fundamentally dishonest and fundamentally honest .... ." In re
Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132
Colo. 591, 604, 296 P.2d 465, 472-73 (1956).
This necessity for lawyers to be honest persons of high moral
character, also finds expression in rules enunciating qualifications for
admission to the bar and the oath of admission. Proof of moral and
ethical qualifications has long been required before attorneys have
been admitted to the practice of law in this state. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P.
209, formerly Colo. Sup. Ct. R. 83 (1935). Attorneys have been disci-
plined for forfeiting their good moral character. E.g., People v. Essing-
ton, 32 Colo. 168, 75 P. 394 (1904); People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258,
64 P. 191 (1901); People v. .Keegan, 18 Colo. 237, 32 P. 424 (1893). In
the oath of admission, lawyers have for years pledged to employ only
such means "for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
me . . . as are consistent with truth and honor .... ." E.g., COLO. R.
Civ. P. 220, formerly Colo. Sup. Ct. R. 83 (1935).
How did the standard of honesty, justice, and morality develop?
What is the source of this standard? It appears that the standard itself
developed from case law and the rules enunciated above. However,
the precise language incorporated into rule 241 of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure referring to the standard of honesty, justice, and
morality was patterned after very similar language being considered
by New Mexico as part of its disciplinary rules and finally adopted by
that state in 1960. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-1(3) (2.04) (1953). Interview
with Norman Berman, Former Member of the Supreme Court Grievance
Committee, in Denver, Colo., Aug. 29, 1972. (The author of rule 241,
Frank Hall, formerly Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court is no longer
living. Thus, the origin of the language of this rule was determined from
the interview, as indicated.)
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gives meaning to this standard.51 In addition to understand-
ing this standard, the value of precedent in disciplinary pro-
ceedings can be to provide consistency and uniformity in de-
cisionmaking. As the Colorado Supreme Court has quite re-
cently said:
In a proceeding of this nature, it is perhaps trite, but never-
theless true, to observe that disciplinary action to be taken in
a given case must in the final analysis depend upon the facts
and circumstances of that particular case, and where a prior
comparable case exists it should be resorted to for guidance
in order that some degree of uniformity may be approxi-
mated.
52
Most of the cases, both past and present, involving the
discipline of attorneys may be grouped into several general
categories. A very common cause for disciplinary action has
been the misappropriation or conversion of a client's funds
to an attorney's own use.53 Many attorneys have been disci-
plined because of dilatory action 5 4 and others have been disci-
51 Generally speaking, in the reported cases similar kinds of conduct
have always given rise to some kind of disciplnary action. It is im-
possible, however, to corrolate a particular offense with a particular
kind of discipline. The court considers each case upon its own facts
and circumstances and thus takes into account many different miti-
gating circumstances. E.g., People v. Gibbons, 157 Colo. 357, 403 P.2d
434 (1965); People v. Irwin, 60 Colo. 177, 152 P. 908 (1915); People v.
Taylor, 32 Colo. 250, 75 P. 914 (1904).
3- People v. Bell, 150 Colo. 245, 247, 372 P.2d 436, 438 (1962) (footnotes
omitted). Accord, People v. Trunk, 162 Colo. 245, 425 P.2d 278 (1967);
People v. Weinstein, 135 Colo. 541, 312 P.2d 1018 (1957). Even though
the Grievance Committee of the Supreme Court looks to prior cases
for guidance to assure uniformity in decisionmaking, the committee
usually only looks at recent cases (those within the past 3 years or so)
for guidance. Furthermore, where a prior comparable Colorado case
cannot be found, the committee will naturally look to cases from other
jurisdictions to help in the determination of what is appropriate disci-
pline. Interviews.
53 E.g., People v. Roads, 503 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1972); People v. Stewart,
497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972); People v. Murphy, 174 Colo. 182, 483 P.2d
224 (1971); People v. Welch, 174 Colo. 177, 483 P.2d 218 (1971); People
v. Keating, 172 Colo. 394, 476 P.2d 265 (1970); People v. Kiley, 170
Colo. 110, 463 P.2d 880 (1969); People v. Tognoni, 167 Colo. 480, 448
P.2d 612 (1968); People v. Mcllhenny, 165 Colo. 156, 437 P.2d 544
(1968); People v. Selby, 165 Colo. 404, 439 P.2d 341 (1968); People v.
Burns, 164 Colo. 490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968); People v. McMichael, 164
Colo. 115, 434 P.2d 417 (1967); People v. Benac, 162 Colo. 479, 426 P.2d
960 (1967); People v. Bell, 150 Colo. 245, 372 P.2d 436 (1962); People
v. Hillyer, 88 Colo. 428, 297 P. 1004 (1931); People v. Marshall, 88
Colo. 394, 297 P. 998 (1931); People v. Winograd, 87 Colo. 384, 287
P. 864 (1930); People v. Essington, 32 Colo. 168, 75 P. 394 (1904);
People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258, 64 P. 191 (1901); People v. Waldron,
28 Colo. 249, 64 P. 186 (1901); People v. Betts, 26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091
(1899).
54 E.g., People v. Bailey, 503 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1972); People v. James, 502
P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1972); People v. Stewart, 497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972);
People v. Atencio, 494 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1972); People v. Kane, 494 P.2d
96 (Colo. 1972); People v. Heyer, 489 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1971); People
v. Welch, 174 Colo. 177, 483 P.2d 218 (1971); People v. Lawther, 174
Colo. 174, 483 P.2d 216 (1971); People v. Keating, 172 Colo. 394, 476
P.2d 265 (1970); People v. Selby, 165 Colo. 404, 439 P.2d 341 (1968);
People v. Fenton, 165 Colo. 131, 437 P.2d 350 (1968); People v. Burns,
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plined for making false representations to a client.15
Disqualification to practice law follows automatically upon
conviction of a felony in Colorado.,5  This has been true for
many years,5 7 with the court placing emphasis on the "moral
turpitude" involved in the commission of a felony. 58 Convic-
tion of a felony involving "moral turpitude" committed in
another jurisdiction has been held to be an adequate basis
for disbarment,' although in such cases disbarment is not
mandatory.
60
However, as is stated in the rules:
[W]here such action constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, con-
viction thereof in a criminal proceeding shall not be a condition
precedent to suspension or to the institution of disciplinary pro-
ceedings, nor shall acquittal necessarily constitute a bar thereto.61
As a rationalization for disciplinary action following conviction
of a crime, the Colorado Supreme Court, in 1899, said:
Pardon, or the payment of a fine, or service of sentence,
may restore one to his civil rights - may blot out the offense
committed - but it cannot wipe out the act of which he was
adjudged guilty, and it is the act that the court considers in
these disbarment proceedings.
62
Concerning disciplinary action following acquittal, the court
has said:
The mere fact that defendant was acquitted does not, how-
ever, affect the question as to whether he has been guilty of
professional misconduct for which he should be disbarred.
63
Thus, in the criminal realm, disciplinary action may be taken
by the supreme court before or after conviction for either a
164 Colo. 490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968); People v. Morgan, 163 Colo. 527,
431 P.2d 781 (1967); People v. Mead, 29 Colo. 344, 68 P. 241 (1902).
55 E.g., People v. Kane, 494 P.2d 96 (Colo. 1972); People v. Welch, 174
Colo. 177, 483 P.2d 218 (1971); People v. Lawther, 174 Colo. 174, 483
P.2d 216 (1971); People v. Keating, 172 Colo. 394, 476 P.2d 265 (1970);
People v. Sindlinger, 28 Colo. 258, 64 P. 191 (1901); People v. Betts,
26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091 (1899).
56 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-17 (1963). However, automatic dis-
qualification is only effective for 7 years after final satisfaction of the
sentence. Ch. 44, § 4, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 267.
57 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-17 (1953), amending COLO. STAT.
ANN. ch. 48, § 533 (1935).
58 E.g., People v. Wilson, 490 P.2d 954 (Colo. 1971); People v. Kaufman, 90
Colo. 8, 5 P.2d 1114 (1931); People v. Cowen, 88 Colo. 571, 298 P. 957
(1931); People v. Monrce, 26 Colo. 232, 57 P. 696 (1899); People v.
Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 57 P. 1079 (1899).
59E.g., People v. Gibbons, 157 Colo. 357, 403 P.2d 434 (1965); People v.
Laska, 105 Colo. 426, 101 P.2d 33 (1940).
60People v. Laska, 105 Colo. 426, 101 P.2d 33 (1940).
61 COLO. R. Civ. P. 241 (emphasis added).
62 People v. Weeber, 26 Colo. 229, 231, 57 P. 1079, 1080 (1899).




felony or a misdemeanor, or even in the absence of a con-
viction, if the act committed by an attorney is contrary to
the highest standards of honesty, justice, or morality.
64
Attorneys have also been disciplined for advertising their
services2 ' In the early case of People v. MacCabe,1 where such
a breach of ethics resulted in disbarment, the court stated:
The ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney
should advertise his talents or his skill, as a shopkeeper ad-
vertises his wares. . . . [F]or anyone to invite or encourage
... litigation is most reprehensible.
0 7
Today, unethical advertising, unless it is of the grossest kind,
would probably not result in formal disciplinary action by the
supreme court.68 However, letters of admonition are frequently
issued by the grievance committee for minor instances of un-
ethical advertising.
69
The examples cited above do not cover all the offenses
for which attorneys have been disciplined in Colorado. Cases
within the categories discussed do involve the most flagrant
and the most predominant violations of this primary disci-
plinary standard. As cases involving letters of admonition or
private censures receive confidential treatment under the
rules, 70 the offenses or charges involved in such cases are
not known. These unreported cases certainly involve different
kinds of offenses, and, almost as certainly, less serious ones.
B. Other Sources
Case law cannot provide a complete understanding of the
standard of honesty, justice, and morality, however, and one
must look beyond it to fully understand its meaning and oper-
ation. Further illumination of this standard may be found
in the common law of ethics, which includes not only case
law, but also encompasses many written codifications. These
codifications include textual materials, opinions of the ethics
committees of the American Bar Association, the Colorado
Bar Association, and other state and local bar associations, the
Canons of Professional Ethics, and the Code of Professional
64 COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
65 People v. Taylor, 32 Colo. 250, 75 P. 914 (1904); People v. MacCabe, 18
Colo. 186, 32 P. 280 (1893). See People v. Ginsberg, 87 Colo. 1.15, 285
P. 758 (1930).
61 18 Colo. 186, 32 P. 280 (1893).
67 Id. at 188, 32 P. at 280.
". Interviews.
Id.
7U COLO. R. Civ. P. 259.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Responsibility.' Additionally, the common law of ethics en-
compasses implicit, yet unwritten, notions of what the "high-
est standards of honesty, justice, and morality" means to the
grievance committee members and to the Colorado Supreme
Court.72 A very subjective element is, therefore, the interpre-
tation and application of this standard. In applying these
unwritten ideas to the meaning of honesty, justice, and moral-
ity, the grievance committee members (and probably the su-
preme court) take the group norm into consideration.7 3 This
norm is determined not only by what the committee members
"feel" the legal community considers contrary to honesty, jus-
tice, or morality, but also by reference to many of the written
codifications of the common law of ethics.
7 4
III. GROSS CARELESSNESS AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE- A SEPARATE BUT
RELATED STANDARD
A separate ground for the discipline of attorneys in Colo-
rado, as is indicated in rule 241, is the commission of acts of
gross carelessness or gross negligence.
7 5
In all cases examined in which an attorney was disciplined
for a violation of this standard, the attorney had been dilatory
in the handling of his client's affairs .7  Furthermore, in the
majority of these cases, the supreme court either directly stated7
or strongly suggested 8 that the attorney being disciplined had,
in each instance, acted contrary to the highest standards of
honesty, justice, and morality. In fact, as is discussed earlier,
cases involving dilatory action comprise one of the major cate-
gories of actions considered contrary to the primary standard
of discipline. These two disciplinary grounds (acts of gross
carelessness or gross negligence, and acts contrary to honesty,
justice, or morality) should not, therefore, be viewed as mu-
tually exclusive. A violation of one would most likely involve
a violation of the other.
71 Interviews.
72 Id. For a detailed analysis of the actual grounds fcr attorney discipline
see Plaut, supra note 37.
73 Id.
74 Id.
7" COLO. R. Civ. P. 241.
71; E.g., People v. Bailey, 503 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1972); PeGple v. James, 502
P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1972); People v. Stewart, 497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972);
People v. Van Nocker, 490 P.2d 697 (Colo. 1971); People v. James, 490
P.2d 291 (Cole. 1971); People v. Tobin, 169 Colo. 218, 454 P.2d 807
(1969); People v. Hillyer, 88 Colo. 428, 297 P. 1004 (1931); People v.
Irwin, 60 Cole. 177, 152 P. 905 (1915).
77 People v. Stewart, 497 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1972); People v. Van N3ikcr,
490 P.2d 697 (Colo. 1971); People v. Tobin, 169 Colo. 218, 454 P.2d 807
(1969).




IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
m COLORADO
Since the Code of Professional Responsibility is part of
the common law of ethics, and since under the rules, "[a]ny
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility . . . may
also constitute cause for discipline," 79 it is necessary to examine
the development and significance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in Colorado [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
A. Legal Status of The Code
The Code, which became effective in Colorado on August
20, 1970,80 replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics, which
were originally adopted in the early 1900's.81 The Canons of
Professional Ethics [hereinafter referred to as the Canons]
were "adopted" by the Colorado Supreme Court as a "stand-
ard of Professional conduct. 's 2 However:
By the "adoption" or "approval" of the canons of ethics the court
did not intend to give them the force or effect of law. "Adoption"
of the canons of ethics by the court was not intended to enlarge,
or narrow, the field of conduct within which disciplinary actions
would be warranted. . . . It was the intention of the court to
recommend the canons of ethics as a wholesome standard of con-
duct, as a statement of general principles best calculated to re-
flect credit upon. the profession . . . . Although the canons' em-
ploying language of wide coverage cannot be given the effect of
law, they nevertheless are recognized generally as a system of
principles of exemplary conduct and good character.
8 3
The supreme court has "adopted" the Code, like the Canons
before it, as a "standard of professional conduct. '8 4 It would
seem to follow then that "by 'adoption' or 'approval' of the
Code of Professional Responsibility the court did not intend
to give [the Code] the force or effect of law."8 5 On January
16, 1964, the following addition was made to rule 241: "Any
violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics . . . may also
constitute cause for discipline."s' This language was amended
to read "Any violation of the Code of Professional Responsi-
7,; Coo. R. Civ. P. 241.
81) Id. app. C.
81 E.g., Cede Civ. P. app. C (1935). The original Canons were later revised
and re-adopted by the supreme court July 30, 1953. Colo. R. Civ. P.
app. B (1953).
82 E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 223, formerly Colo. Sup. Ct. R. 83 E (1935).
S3 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
132 Colo. 591, 604, 296 P.2d 465, 472-73 (1956). Accord, Petition of the
Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958).
84 COLO. R. Civ. P. 223.
, In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
132 Colo. 591, 604, 296 P.2d 465, 472-73 (1956).
b"Colo. R. Civ. P. 241 (Supp. 1967).
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bility . . .,,87 when the code was adopted. This addition to
the rules apparently did not give the Canons and subsequently
the Code the force of law since the Colorado Supreme Court
reiterated, in the 1965 case of Bryant v. Hand,8 its earlier posi-
tion that the Canons were not binding on the courts and were
not law.
However, the case of Bryant v. Hand arose before the
addition to rule 241 was made in 1964 and the trial court
decision was also rendered before the rule change." ' Even
though the supreme court's decision in the case followed the
rule change, there is no evidence from either the case or the
briefs that the court even considered the question of whether
or not this addition to rule 241 could be interpreted so as to
give the Canons (and now the Code) the force of law.
Before the case of Bryant v. Hand was decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court,
earlier in the same year, ruled that the Canons by themselves
were not law, and thus were not binding on the courts.""
However, like the Colorado Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court did not consider the question of whether a
rule such as Colorado's rule 241 could make the Canons (or
the Code) law. Thus, it remains unresolved whether the non-
mandatory provision of rule 241, which provides that "[a]ny
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility . . . may
also constitute cause for discipline,"9 1 gives the Code the force
and effect of law.92 However, the case of Bryant v. Hand still
stands for the principle that the Canons (and the Code) are
not law, and it has not been overruled.
It also remains unresolved why the addition was made
to rule 241. It seems likely that the supreme court adopted this
change so as to give this "standard of professional conduct '" '
(the Canons and the Code) explicit recognition within the
disciplinary rules. 4
One may ask why the standard of honesty, justice, and
morality has the force and effect of law if the Code of Pro-
87 COLO. R. Crv. P. 241.
88 158 Colo. 56, 404 P.2d 521 (1965).
89, Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 6, Bryant v. Hand, 158 Colo. 56, 404 P.2d
521 (1965).
90 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
1 COLO. R. Civ. P. 241 (emphasis added).
92 See discussion at p. 223 infra indicating that in practice the Code has
the effect of law.




fessional Responsibility may not. Both are a part of the same
rule. Quite simply, the standard of honesty, justice, and mor-
ality was recognized as a standard of professional conduct be-
fore incorporation into the rules, and through case law, had
been given the force and effect of law."'
B. Importance of the Code
On June 25, 1970, the Colorado Supreme Court authorized
the issuance of letters of admonition:
Where investigation by the grievance committee of an in-
formal complaint discloses minor ethical violations or in-
stances of relatively trivial misconduct and the committee is
of the opinion that disciplinary action by the supreme court
is not warranted but also is of the opinion that the complaint
should not be dismissed as being without merit, the committee
may direct that a letter of admonition . . . be sent . . . to
the attorney of whom complaint was made.961
With this rule change, the supreme court delegated the au-
thority to issue letters for minor ethical violations to the
grievance committee, retaining the power of formal discipline
for conduct inherently wrong, immoral, or dishonest.
Since any violation of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility may in fact constitute cause for discipline by the supreme
court or by the grievance committee,97 the question of whether
the Code has the full force and effect of law is only of
academic interest. Despite the use of permissive language
rather than mandatory language under rule 241 ("Any viola-
tion of the Code . . . may also constitute cause for discipline.")
discipline almost always follows by the court or grievance
committee for a violation of the Code.98 Even if the Code is
not law, one could realistically argue that its effect is the
same as if it were law.
Under rule 241, "that the act complained of is malum
prohibitum rather than malum in se shall not of itself con-
stitute a defense to a charge of misconduct." If disciplinary
action is brought against an attorney, he cannot raise as an
adequate defense, in and of itself, the fact that the act com-
plained of was not inherently wrong. However, it would seem
from the language, "shall not of itself," that this defense could
be raised with other defenses, and on this basis might be suc-
See discussion in note 51 supra.
Colo. Sup. Ct. Order, Rule authorizing Letters of Admonition (Exhibit
B) (June 25, 1970). Accord, COLO. R. Civ. P. 246.




The Code thus can be seen as having major importance in
Colorado as it serves as the primary basis for issuing letter of
admonition.10 As previously discussed, the Code also provides a
helpful codification of the definition of conduct contrary to
honesty, justice, or morality. For example, two types of con-
duct, conversion or misappropriation of a client's funds and
dilatory action, which the Colorado Supreme Court has con-
sidered contrary to the highest standards of honesty, justice,
or morality"" are covered within the Code under Disciplinary
Rules (DR) 9-102 (Preserving Identity of Funds and Prop-
erty of a Client) and DR 6-101 (Failing to Act Competently). 102
However, the Code does not give complete expression to
all kinds of conduct which could be considered contrary to
this standard. Indeed, it would seem impossible to list in any
code every transgression which an attorney might commit con-
trary to this overall standard.)0 3 To cover this inadequacy, the
standard of honesty, justice, and morality has been retained
within the disciplinary rules of the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure.1
0 4
Examination of the case law of Colorado indicates that
the Code has been of only minor significance as no mention
of the Code is made in any disciplinary case. However, few
cases have arisen since the recent adoption of the Code, and
the reported cases involve only the more flagrant examples
of professional misconduct. Thus, the supreme court probably
feels it unnecessary to make references to the Code in these
cases.10 5 Even though the Code is not mentioned in reported
decisions, references to Code violations are made in letters
of admonition,'0 6 which are, of course, confidential in nature.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion and analysis indicates, at-
torneys in Colorado are expected to act in accordance with
the highest standards of honesty, justice, and morality. Fail-
99 No cases employing this defense have been reported.
100 Interviews. Letters of Admonition have only been authorized under
the rules since June 25, 1970, approximately the same time that the
Code was adopted.
101 Cases cited notes 55-56 supra.







ure to act in this manner constitutes the primary basis for
disciplinary action being taken against attorneys in the state.
As has also been discussed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
define all of the kinds of conduct which could be considered
by the supreme court and the grievance committee to be
contrary to this overall standard.
Help in ascertaining the meaning of this standard, how-
ever, can be found in case law, written codifications in this
area (such as the Code), and the unwritten notions of what
the standard means to the legal community.
Most members of the bar probably have an understand-
ing or "feeling" about this standard. Certainly if a question
arises as to what conduct may or may not be permissible in a
given situation, an attorney can turn to the above-mentioned
sources to help find an answer to his question. Nonetheless,
the practicality of such a course of action remains question-
able. The practitioner may not have the time, or may not be
willing to take the time, to research and seek out an answer
to a nagging ethical question. And should he take the time,
certain answers will be elusive or unavailable.
Furthermore, what the Colorado Supreme Court and the
grievance committee considers contrary to honesty, justice, or
morality may well change over time as personalities on the
court and on the committee change. Additionally, it is doubt-
ful if there is adequate representation on the court and on the
committee of the varying viewpoints that exist within the
legal community as to the meaning of honesty, justice, and
morality in different situations. Thus, an attorney may be dis-
ciplined in accordance with dominant bar, committee, or court
"standards," and yet be acting in accordance with a different,
and yet acceptable, value structure of his more immediate
peers.
The Colorado Supreme Court is currently in the process
of amending the disciplinary rules. The forthcoming changes
will be both procedural and substantive in nature.107 Many
of the procedural changes may remedy some of the problems
suggested in section I.B. of this note. Any substantive changes
probably will not significantly affect the general standards or
grounds of discipline currently applicable to attorneys in
Colorado.
Under the new amendments, there will probably be five
1117 Interview with Mr. Edward Day, Justice of the Colorado Supreme
Court, in Denver, Colo., June 28, 1972.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
disciplinary grounds spelled out: (1) acts committed contrary
to the highest standards of honesty, justice, or morality; (2)
acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(3) acts of gross carelessness or negligence; (4) acts in viola-
tion of the criminal laws of Colorado; (5) acts in violation of
acceptable rules of legal ethics. 1 8 This last disciplinary ground
would be the only basis for attorney discipline not presently
recognized under the rules of civil procedure or statutes.
If in the new rules the court should use language of
mandatory implementation in setting forth the disciplinary
standards, the Code would be recognized as having the full
force and effect of law. But as discussed, it can be argued
that the Code presently has the same status as if it were
recognized as law. The primary effect of such a change would
simply be to codify the status of the Code under the discipli-
nary rules.
Douglas H. Balcombe
108 Id.; Interviews.
VOL. 50
